lthough the Arbitration Act 1996 is founded on the principle of upholding party autonomy, ensuring that an arbitral award is ‘final and binding’ (section 58), it also provides limited and narrowly interpreted grounds for challenging an award.
One such ground is the appeal on a question of law under section 69 of the act. Before granting permission to appeal, the court must be satisfied, inter alia, that the decision of the tribunal on the question of law is ‘obviously wrong’ (section 69(3)(c)(i)). The test to be met under section 69(3)(c)(i) is a high one and will rarely be satisfied. As Hobhouse J put it in President of India v Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 274, it is to be ‘tantamount to persuading the court that the appeal will almost certainly be successful’. However, where permission has been granted, the application need only show that the tribunal’s decision was ‘wrong’. The recent decision of Aston Martin MENA Ltd v Aston Martin Lagonda Ltd [2025] EWHC 2531 (Comm), in which Aston Martin MENA Ltd (AMMENA), was granted leave to appeal under section 69(3)(c)(i)), helpfully illustrates the approach the courts will adopt.